take every penny of Social Security surplus this year, he is going to take every penny of Social Security surplus next year, every penny the next year, every penny the next year, every penny the next year-virtually every penny for the next 10 years. This is a course that is a disaster. It is time for people to stand up and speak out and face up to this fiscal disaster.

I thank my colleagues and yield the

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2003

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the need for hate crimes legislation. On May 1, 2003, Senator KENNEDY and I introduced the Local Law Enforcement Act, a bill that would add new categories to current hate crimes law, sending a signal that violence of any kind is unacceptable in our society.

I would like to describe a terrible crime that occurred in Westbury, NY. On September 19, 2001, a 42-year-old man was charged with a bias crime after assaulting a gas-station attendant. Police reported that the victim was punched in the head by the assailant after he had questioned the attend-

ant about his ethnicity.

I believe that Government's first duty is to defend its citizens, to defend them against the harms that come out of hate. The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act is a symbol that can become substance. I believe that by passing this legislation and changing current law, we can change hearts and minds as well.

THE TEN WORST "BAD APPLE" GUN DEALERS IN AMERICA

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, earlier this week, the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence released a report entitled "The Ten Worst Bad Apple Gun Dealers in America." This report analyzed national crime gun trace data from 1989 through 1996 gathered by the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and identified the 10 gun dealers who sold the most crime guns and exhibited sales patterns that ATF considers to be indicative of gun trafficking. According to the Brady Campaign, most gun dealers are never associated with illegal activities, but guns sold by these 10 dealers turn up in the wrong hands over and over again.

According to the report, one dealer in Indianapolis, IN, sold 398 guns later used in crimes from 1989 through 1996. These guns were involved in at least 7 homicides, 12 assaults, and 2 robberies. In addition, the Brady campaign found that between October 2001 and January 2002, one man used two straw purchasers to buy 25 handguns from this dealer and then resold them on the streets of Chicago. Another trafficker used straw buyers to obtain 12 and 9 guns on two different occasions in 2002.

Another gun dealer identified in the Brady report, this one in West Mil-

waukee, WI, sold 554 guns later used in crimes. These guns were involved in at least 27 homicides, 101 assaults, and 9 robberies. From 1994 to 1996, 1 straw purchaser bought 10 guns from this dealer. Several of the weapons have been recovered from violent criminals, including a murderer, a rapist, an armed robber who later raped a woman at gunpoint, a man who shot at a police officer, and three juvenile shooting suspects.

The Brady report highlights the potential damage and abuse that just 10 bad apple dealers can cause. The Brady report reveals the disregard of a few in the gun industry for even basic self-regulation. The Lawful Commerce in Arms Act that recently passed the House and that has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee would shield negligent and reckless gun dealers from many legitimate civil lawsuits. Certainly, those in the industry who conduct their business negligently or recklessly should not be shielded from the civil consequences of their ac-

INVESTIGATING PREWAR **INTELLIGENCE**

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President. for almost a week now the Senate has been debating the appropriations bill for the Department of Defense. Several amendments have been offered regarding the need to determine the accuracy of our pre-war intelligence and the use of that intelligence by the Executive specifically, a reference in the President's State of the Union message that has now been acknowledged to be erroneous. I want to take a few minutes to comment on some of these continuing questions regarding the accuracy of pre-war intelligence which became a part of the public debate soon following the invasion of Iraq. I have worked with Chairman ROBERTS to find a bipartisan approach to reviewing these issues. On June 20 we reached agreement on the terms of reference for what was by then an ongoing inquiry. I had proposed a broader, more formal approach but after some discussion agreed to proceed with a structured review and see where the information led

The committee has been poring through the volumes of material provided by the intelligence community and interviewing relevant officials, and has held two closed hearings and one briefing.

But as this process has moved forward it has become increasing clear that a business as usual, oversight review is not going to be able to address our expanding appreciation of the scope of the problem. Every day brings new information, often from the press, which requires us to make sure that we have the right charter and organization for this inquiry.

Tuesday it was the story, reported in the Washington Post, that a four-star general was sent to Niger last year to inquire about the security of Niger's uranium. According to the article, the general said that he came away convinced that Niger's uranium stock was secure. Obviously, there is much to be learned about this. Why was he sent? What was his mission? Who was aware of the trip? And what happened to the general's report when he returned?

This revelation follows on the heels of a week of accusations, denials, admissions and recriminations among the senior members of the administration's national security team about who was responsible for language related to Iraqi uranium purchases appearing in the President's 2003 State of the Union speech. By week's end, Director Tenet had stepped forward to accept responsibility. His statement, however, raised many other questions about how this information was handled by those outside the intelligence community.

The credibility of the intelligence related to Iraq and Niger first came to public attention in March when the IAEA determined the documents supporting the charges to be fraudulent. I immediately asked Director Mueller to have the FBI investigate the counterintelligence implications of this revelation. Subsequently, Senator ROBERTS joined me in asking the Inspectors General at the CIA and State Department to investigate how this information was handled by the intelligence community.

These investigations, however, will answer only questions of how we came into possession of these documents and what the intelligence agencies did with them. They cannot, because of the reach of these investigative organizations, deal with the questions that have dominated the public debate in recent days. How did information, known to be dubious at best, find its way into the President's State of the Union speech? Who is responsible for inserting the information? Were reservations properly conveyed to senior officials? If not, why not? If so, why were those reservations not heeded?

It seems clear that the White House staff played a key role in this episode. Unless we follow the evidence wherever it leads, we will end up reporting to the American people only part of the story. And the Niger episode is just the first example of what we can expect as we get further into this process.

I am committed to a complete, bipartisan investigation that covers the full spectrum from collection to the analysis and use of prewar intelligence about Iraq. I believe that the Senate Intelligence Committee has the authority to conduct that investigation. But it has to be willing to use the full authority that the Senate has given it, or to ask the Senate if it needs any additional authority.

We should bite the bullet and authorize a formal investigation, explicitly state that it will examine the full range of activities concerning prewar intelligence—which includes the use of that intelligence—and provide for the